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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #427-81
29 January 1981MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceVIA : Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director for National Foreign AssessmentRichard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for WarningFROM : [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

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SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 22 January 1981)Update on Status of Soviet Military Forces
In and Around Poland

1. Soviet military forces in and around Poland have assumed a normal peacetime activity level. Training activity, although increased, is regarded as normal for this period of the semi-annual training cycle. The mobilization and training activities of the past several months have left Soviet forces better prepared to intervene in Poland should that political decision be made. (S)

2. Soviet training activity over the next few months will involve the progressive integration of smaller units into larger formations.

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The Polish Domestic Situation

3. The present situation is one of mounting tensions. There have been an increasing number of strikes, some national, but most conducted on a regional or local basis. The primary focus of these strikes and of Solidarity's current demands is the request for a five-day forty-hour work week. In addition, the National Solidarity leadership has now advocated legal registration of Rural Solidarity. In addition, Solidarity has announced that it will undertake a review of the fulfillment of the Gdansk agreements on 4 February. There have been increasing signs of disarray in the Party and a postponement of the extraordinary Party Congress, reportedly scheduled for April, is a likely possibility. The Church continues to counsel moderation. The cumulative effect of these new brushfires could be a new national confrontation, but it is impossible to foresee just when such a confrontation might occur. (S)

4. The regime continues its tougher line adopted after the first of the year. It has used force or the threat of force to break up local Solidarity sit-in demonstrations. It still insists that it will dock the pay of workers who did not work on Saturday, January 10th which was scheduled as a work day by the government. In view of this, to pay individuals who boycotted work would be tantamount to another capitulation to Solidarity. State/INR believes that, despite the uncertainties of its position, the less compromising stand that the regime has adopted toward Solidarity may amount to progress in controlling the situation, or at a minimum, that the regime has not lost ground vis-a-vis the unions. (S)

5. Cracks have appeared in the Solidarity leadership; the more militant elements appear to have prevailed over the moderates in establishing an uncompromising position on the issue of the five-day forty-hour work week. Some analysts suggested that Walesa is not as firmly in control of the Solidarity leadership as he was some months ago. (S)

Polish-Soviet Relations

6. There still have been no major Soviet leadership statements on Polish developments, although the Soviet media has assumed a more strident tone in criticizing Solidarity and the domestic instability in Poland. State/INR suggested that Soviet confidence in Kania now is about the same as it was on December 5th when he won his reprieve. The other agencies felt it more likely that confidence in Kania has diminished and will continue to diminish as time passes, in view of continuing domestic tensions and Kania's failure thus far to make convincing progress in eliminating them. (S)

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Soviet Reactions to the Reagan Administration

7. Commentary has been sparse thus far. A January article by Gromyko in Kommunist is the most authoritative statement to appear recently. The Foreign Minister suggests that Moscow is anxious to resume the SALT dialogue but may reject U.S. proposals that stray very far from those already agreed on in SALT II. It is up to the United States, according to Gromyko, to take the initiative in this matter. (S)

8. DIA offered the view that the Soviet policy in the Third World and in Europe would be basically unaffected by the new Administration. The past half-decade has shown that Soviet behavior in the Third World is not a dependent variable in their relations with the United States. The Soviets will not moderate their behavior but will seek both to encourage and to exploit opportunities and political conflict which arise in the Third World. Thus far, Soviet media generally have avoided provocative statements and have taken the position that the USSR "will respond to constructive steps" with respect to SALT II. Analysts agreed that at least initially there will be a period of watchful waiting in which the Soviets seek to take stock of the new Administration. (S)

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